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EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY-FREE MOVEMENT OF
GOODS-LEGISLATION OF A MEMBER STATE, RESERVING CERTAIN WINE APPEL-
LATIONS FOR DOMESTIC PRODUCTS ONLY, HAS AN EFFECT EQUIVALENT TO PRO-
HIBITED QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS IF SUCH APPELLATIONS Do NOT DESCRIBE
WINE PRODUCTS WHICH POSSESS QUALITIES AND CHARACTERISTICS ATRIBUTA-
BLE TO THEIR GEOGRAPHIC ORIGIN.
The Federal Republic of Germany enacted legislation restricting the use
of certain wine appellations to German-produced wines, foreign wines orig-
inating in countries where German is the official language, and wines
containing 60 percent German grapes.' The Commission of the European
Communities (hereinafter referred to as the Commission)' determined3
The German law on vine products... [the German Wine Act of July 14, 1971,
[1971] BGB1. I 63], and the implementing regulation ... [the Sparkling Wine
and Brandy Regulations of July 15, 1971, [1971] BGB1. I 64], provide, inter alia:
(a) for sparkling wines:
-that the appellation "Sekt" may describe only a home-produced
sparkling wine which satisfies the conditions of quality required by Sec-
tion 3 of the implementing regulation on sparkling wines and spirits
obtained by distilling wine and may be applied to quality foreign wines
only if German is an official language throughout the whole of the country
of production (Section 8 of the foregoing regulation). By virtue of Section
26(3) of the law on vine products, this appellation may, moreover, be
linked to the condition that the sparkling wine be produced from a mini-
mum proportion of home-grown grapes;
-that the appellation "Prfidikatssekt" may describe only a home-
produced sparkling wine which fulfills the above-mentioned conditions
and contains at least 60 percent of home-grown grapes;
(b) for spirits obtained by distilling wines:
-that the appellation "Weinbrand" may be used only for products
entitled to the appellation "spirits obtained by distilling quality wine"
(Qualitatsbranntwein aus Wein) and if German is an official language
throughout the whole of the country of production ....
As regards sparkling wines and spirits obtained by distilling foreign
wines other than those coming from countries in which German is the
official language, the law on vine products and the regulation referred to
above provide that the designations applicable are, according to the qual-
ity, respectively those of "Schaumwein" or "Qualitatsschaumwein" and
"Branntwein aus Wein" or "QualitAtsbranntwein aus Wein."
Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany, 2 CCH COMM.
MKT. REP. 8293, at 7382 (1975).
2 The Commission is the executive branch of the European Economic Community (EEC).
It is composed of 13 members who are appointed on the basis of their competence and
independence by mutual agreement of the governments of the Member States. The four
largest Member States-France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom-have two com-
missioners each, and the other Member States have one each. A. PARRY & S. HARDY, EEC
LAW (1973).
' The Commission's action was pursuant to article 169(1) of the Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community, done March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (unofficial English
version) [hereinafter cited as Rome Treaty]. The Treaty may also be found in CCH COMM.
MKT. REP. 151 et seq. (1973). Article 169, paragraph 1 states that if the Commission considers
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that the German restrictions were equivalent in effect to quantitative re-
strictions on trade between Member States of the European Economic
Community (EEC), which are prohibited by article 30 of the Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Economic Community (hereinafter referred to as the
Rome Treaty)4 and, as regards sparkling wines, article 12, paragraph 2(b)
of Council Regulation No. 816/70 of April 18, 1970.1 When Germany refused
to terminate the alleged infringements, the Commission brought suit in the
European Court of Justice' under article 169, paragraph 21 of the Rome
Treaty seeking a declaration by the Court that Germany had failed in its
obligations under that Treaty and under Council Regulation No. 816/70.1
Held, Commission's request granted. Measures restricting the use of
names which are not indicative of origin or source to domestic products
that a Member State has failed to fulfill an obligation under this Treaty, it shall deliver a
reasoned opinion on the matter after giving the Member State concerned the opportunity to
submit its observations.
4 Note 3 supra. Article 30 states that quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures
having equivalent effect shall, without prejudice to the following provisions, be prohibited
between Member States.
Additional Provisions for the Common Market Organization for Wine, [1970] E.E.C.
J.O. No. L.99, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 614, at 677 (1973). This regulation implemented
the community wine market organization for wines not requiring distillation. Hence, for the
purpose of this decision, its significance concerns sparkling wines alone. Article 12(2)(b) of
Regulation No. 816/70 prohibits the application of quantitative restrictions or measures hav-
ing equivalent effect in wine trade with third countries.
, The Court of Justice is the institution responsible for ensuring that the law of the EEC
is observed. It has three primary powers under the treaty: settling disputes, rendering binding
opinions, and rendering preliminary rulings. P. KAPTEYN & P. VAN THEMATT, INTRODUCTION
TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AFTER THE ACCESSION OF NEW MEMBER STATES 90
(1973).
' Article 169, paragraph 2 states that if the Member State concerned does not comply with
the opinion within the period laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter
before the Court of Justice.
Article 171 of the Rome Treaty requires that Member States found guilty of failure to
fulfill an obligation under the Treaty take the necessary measures to comply with the judg-
ment of the Court.
In support of its contention that Germany had failed to fulfill a Treaty obligation the
Commission argued that the terms "Sekt" (sparkling wine) and "Weinbrand" (brandy) were
generic terms which Germany could not convert to protected indications of origin by legisla-
tion and that these terms had more consumer appeal than names allowed imported wines,
thereby placing the wine products of other countries at a disadvantage. The Commission also
argued that Commission Directive 70/50 of December 22, 1969, requiring abolition of and
enumerating measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions in existence
when the Rome Treaty entered into force, applied also to measures introduced in a Member
State after the Treaty entered into force. Directive 70/50. This Directive was based on the
provisions of article 33, paragraph 7 of the Rome Treaty, which required the abolition of
measures which have an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions on imports and which
are not covered by other provisions adopted in pursuance of the Rome Treaty. [1970] E.E.C.
J.O. L13/29. More specifically, the Commission claimed that Germany violated article 2(3)(s)
of Directive 70/50, which prohibits measures which "confine names which are not indicative
of origin or source to domestic products only."
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only have an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions contrary to arti-
cle 30 of the Rome Treaty and, as regards sparkling wines, to article 12,
paragraph 2(b) of Council Regulation No. 816/70. A name is not indicative
of origin or source unless the product it designates does in fact possess
qualities and characteristics attributable to the geographic locality of its
origin, so as to distinguish it from all other products. Commission of the
European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany, 2 CCH CoMM.
MKT. REP. 8293 (1975).
The free movement of goods between Member States, a fundamental
principle of the EEC,9 is based on a theory of classical free trade." This
principle is used to achieve economic integration through the elimination
of national barriers between Member States so as to permit the natural
economic forces within the Community to reallocate resources more effi-
ciently." For example, without artificial barriers an increase in competi-
tion from firms in other Member States should cause efficient firms to
expand and inefficient firms to disappear or enter other fields. 2 This eco-
nomic expansion and development, through one common market rather
than several national markets, should also result in great economies of
scale. 3 The provisions of the Rome Treaty incorporate this theory," as well
as modifications necessary for adaptation to the existing economic struc-
ture of the Member States. 5
The free movement of goods is to be achieved through the establishment
of a customs union'" and through the elimination of quantitative restric-
tions between Member States. 7 Article 3011 of the Rome Treaty prohibits
not only quantitative restrictions, but also "all measures having equivalent
effect" of quantitative restrictions in order to prevent Member States from
evading the principle of the prohibition. 9 The phrase "measures having
See Rome Treaty, supra note 3, art. 3.
D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 1160 (1968) [hereinafter cited as VAGTSl.
Hjorth, The Common Agricultural Policy: Crisis in the Common Market, 40 WASH. L.
REV. 685, 688 (1965).
12 Id.
* VAGTS, supra note 10, at 1160.
* The achievement of economic integration is not limited to the establishment of free
movement of goods. Article 3 of the Rome Treaty states that the goals of the EEC shall also
be achieved through the abolition of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons, services,
and capital among other activities.
11 For example, article 8 of the Rome Treaty allows for a transition period of 12 years to
allow the Member States to adapt. This period ended on December 31, 1969. 1 CCH COMM.
MKT. REP. 195 (1973).
'1 Rome Treaty, supra note 3, arts. 12-29. The customs union requires the elimination of
customs duties between Member States (arts. 12-17), the elimination of charges having an
effect equivalent to customs duties (art. 12), and the establishment of a common customs
tariff (arts. 18-29).
'7 Id. arts. 30-37.
' Note 4 supra.
g Commission of the European Communities v. Republic of Italy, COURT DECISIONS, CCH
COMM. MKT. REP. 8079 (Transfer Binder 1969).
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equivalent effect" is not defined in the Rome Treaty; however, the Euro-
pean Court of Justice has accepted the Commission's view20 by stating that
it covers "all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable
of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-
community trade."'"
Article 30 and the other provisions of the Rome Treaty on the free move-
ment of goods2 2 apply not only to industrial goods, but also to agricultural
products.22 However, the Rome Treaty includes additional provisions spe-
cifically governing the agricultural sector. 4 These provisions require the
adoption of a common agricultural policy2" with the goals of increasing
agricultural productivity, ensuring a fair standard of living for the agricul-
tural community, stabilizing markets, assuring the availability of supplies,
and ensuring that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices. 2 These
objectives are to be achieved mainly through the organization of Com-
munity markets.2 7
Wine and wine products have been subject to regulation under the Rome
Treaty since 1962 when Council Regulation 24/622 was enacted. 29 However,
completion of the regulations implementing the Community wine market
" The Commission has stated that this concept includes any provisions set forth by stat-
utes, regulations, administrative actions, administrative practices, practices of a public au-
thority, or practices which can be imputed to a public authority, precluding imports which
might otherwise take place. [1967] E.E.C. J.O. 9/901.
2, Public Prosecutor v. Benoit and Gustave Dassonville, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8276
(1974) (CCH head note).
n Rome Treaty, supra note 3, arts. 9-37.
z' Id. art. 38. Article 38 states in part:
1. The Common Market shall extend to agriculture and trade in agricultural
products ....
2. Save where there are povisions to the contrary in Articles 39 to 46 inclusive,
the rules laid down for the establishment of the common market shall apply to
agricultural products.
24 Id. arts. 38-47.
Id. art. 38, para. 4.
Id. art. 39.
z Id. art. 40, para 2.
z Council Regulation 24/62, [1962] E.E.C. J.O. 30, in the "opinion of its authors was only
'the beginning of a common policy of the Member States for solving wine and viticultural
problems'." R. & V. Haegeman v. Commission of the European Communities, COURT DECI-
SION, CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8181, at 8447 (Transfer Binder 1972).
29 R. & V. Haegeman v. E.C. Commission, CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8181, at 8447 (1972)
(Submissions of the Advocate General) stated:
Regulation 24/62 was really a preparatory act that was intended to permit, through
an exact knowledge of the production potential of Member States and the periodic
estimates of the quantities of wines and musts available, a later organization that
was designed to stabilize prices by adjusting supply to demand. Thus the regulation
provided for the establishment of a register of vineyards, the mandatory reporting
at regular intervals of harvests and stocks on hand, and a provisional annual bal-
ance sheet, so that the available supply and possible needs of the Community could
be estimated.
[VOL. 6:309
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
organization was delayed until 1970.11 Because the wine-growing policies
and conditions of the Member States varied widely,3 compromise could
not be reached. 3 Also, the major wine-producing Member States wished
to allow only Community-produced wine products to be sold in their coun-
tries, whereas the other Member States wanted to continue to import wine
from non-Member States in order to satisfy their demand. 3 Germany in
particular, due to its desire to maintain national autonomy in merchandise
legislation, hindered efforts to complete the regulations. 34 The German
Wine Act and the Sparkling Wine and Brandy Regulations 35 were enacted
pursuant to the completed regulations which implemented the wine mar-
ket.3
In affirming the Commission's decision that Germany's legislation vio-
lates article 30 of the Rome Treaty in the instant case, the European Court
of Justice first emphasized that the German legislation must be considered
in light of the prohibitions in the Rome Treaty3 and Regulation No.
816/70.30 However, the Court relied on the language in article 2, paragraph
3(s) of Directive 70/50. 31 The Court stated that designations and indica-
tions of origin as used in that Directive could only be protected if they
ensured the protection of producers against unfair competition and the
protection of consumers against error. Such terms could only do this if they
designated products which did in fact possess qualities and characteristics
attributable to the geographic locality of their origin; indications of origin
could only be used if the geographic origin of the product gave it a distinc-
tive quality and specific characteristics." The Court said that the German
" The implementing regulations were: Regulation 816/70 of April 18, 1970, Additional
Provisions for the Common Market Organization for Wine, [1970] E.E.C. J.0. No. L.99, 1
CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1 614, at 677 (1973); Regulation 817/70 of April 28, 1970, Special
Provisions for Quality Wines Produced in Specific Regions, [1970] E.E.C. J.O. No. I. 99, 1
CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 616, at 699-12 (1973).
1' OECD, REPORT ON THE AGRICULTURAL POuCY OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 70
(1973) [hereinafter cited as OECD].
32 Cohen, EEC Wine Regulation, 10 COMM. MKT. 117 (1970).
SId.
' Id. The regulations were finally completed because Italy refused to confirm other regula-
tions if the wine regulations were not completed. Id.
1 German Wine Act of July 14, 1971, [1971] BGBI. I 63; Sparkling Wine and Brandy
Regulations of July 15, 1971, [1971] BGBI. 1 64.
-Is Regulations cited note 30 supra; see Commission of the European Communities v. Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8293, at 7382 (1975).
11 Rome Treaty, supra note 3, arts. 30-37.
38 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8293, at 7389. The Court referred specifically to article 12,
paragraph 2(b) of this Regulation. See note 5 supra.
a1 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8293, at 7389. Article 2, paragraph 3(s) of Directive 70/50
states that measures which have an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions on imports
include those which "confine names which are not indicative of origin or source to domestic
products only." [1970] E.E.C. J.O. L13/29.
1" 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8293, at 7389. Prior to the Sparkling Wines decision, the Court
had not defined "indications of origin" in this context.
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wine legislation regarding the terms "Sekt" and "Weinbrand" did not
fulfill these criteria because the geographical origin could not be a national
territory" nor be defined by a national language.2 Also, the German wine
could be manufactured from grapes of indeterminate origin, the method
of manufacture used in Germany could be used in other countries, the
quality standards for wines imported to Germany were similar to those
applicable to German wines, and not all German manufacturers were re-
quired to use the same production methods. Hence, the German products
Sekt and Weinbrand did not have peculiar qualities and unique character-
istics which would make them typically German products.43 The Court also
determined that the term "Pridikatssekt" could not be protected because
the use of 60 percent German grapes could not give a wine product a special
quality justifying protection."
The Court concluded that, because the German legislation confined
names not indicative of source or origin to domestic products and because
such reservation of terms would force other Member States to use terms
which are unknown or less appreciated by the consumer, the wine laws
favored the internal marketing of German products at the expense of the
products from other Member States.45 The German restrictions thus vio-
lated article 30 of the Rome Treaty and article 12, paragraph 2(b) of Regu-
lation No. 816/70.6
At first reading the Court's analysis appears contradictory. The Court
stated that indications of origin could only be protected if they insured
both the interests of the producers against unfair competition and the
Id. at 7390. Germany argued that
the appellations "Sekt" and "Weinbrand" are closely linked to a particular German
method of producing the products to which they apply. This method, which was
later defined by the legislature, consists of a specific combination of several ele-
ments, capable of being supervised in all its details, by means of which products
are obtained with a specific taste ("German flavor"). This taste confers on the
products described as "Sekt" and "Weinbrand" their specific characteristics, as a
result of which it is impossible to confuse them with foreign sparkling wines and
spirits obtained by distilling wine. For producers based outside Germany to imitate
this ta&te would be very difficult if not impossible, because of the economic and
financial problems it would involve.
Id. at 7384.
" Id. at 7390. Germany submitted that the "official language clause was inserted because
Austria also had legislation regulating the use of the names "Sekt" and "Weinbrand." Ger-
many was faced with the choice of forbidding the use of those names on imported Austrian
products or of making an exception. The German legislature chose the latter course because
German imports of Austrian Sekt and Weinbrand were small and generally confined to
frontier areas and because the act of forbidding the use of the names would have appeared
as an unfriendly act toward Austria. Id. at 7385.
,2 Id. at 7390.
Id. at 7391.
45 Id.
", Id. at 7392.
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interests of consumers against indications which could deceive them.4"
However, in reaching its decision, the Court appears to have shown a lack
of concern for both consumers and producers. Indifference toward the ef-
fect of the legislation on consumers appears in the Court's rejection of
Germany's argument that the legislation simply embodied the existing
situation because German consumers recognized the restricted terms as
referring to a domestic product.4 8 Advocate General Warner" suggested in
his submission to the Court 0 that this was true concerning Weinbrand
because German public opinion polls showed that German consumers did
in fact think of Weinbrand as a domestic product 5' and because brandy
imports had always been small.52 However, the Court rejected this submis-
sion as well as the suggestion 53 that new public opinion polls be taken as
to whether the name "Sekt" had a greater appeal to the German public
than "Schaumwein"5 and whether "Sekt" connoted a German product.
The Court said that Germany could not justify protection given indications
of origin by relying on consumer opinion based on public opinion polls.' '
The Court also refused to protect the German wine producers. First, it
is well-known that the purpose of the legislation was to protect the German
wine industry." Germany argued that it could protect certain wine appel-
lations because those terms were indirect indications of origin and similar
indications were protected in other Member States." Germany also argued
' Id. at 7390.
' Id. at 7391.
' The Court of Justice is assisted by four Advocates-General who have the duty, "to
present publicly, with complete impartiality and independence, reasoned conclusions on
cases submitted before the Court of Justice, with a view to assisting the latter in the perform-
ance of its duties as laid down in Article 164." Rome Treaty, supro note 3, art. 166.
2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8293, at 7393.
Id. at 7404-05. Three public opinion surveys were conducted in Germany concerning the
meaning of the word "Weinbrand". In the first survey, which was conducted in 1966, 75
percent of the people interviewed thought that Weinbrand was a German product, 5 percent
thought it was a foreign product, 2 percent had never heard of it, and 18 percent did not know
whether it was a German or a foreign product. Of those surveyed who bought or drank
Weinbrand, 85 percent thought it was a German product. Two other surveys were conducted
in 1973. In one, 87 percent of the sample thought Weinbrand was a German product; in the
other, 80 percent thought it was a German product. Id.
52 Germany produced 943,618 hectoliters of brandy in 1966, whereas imports amounted to
only 59,516 hectoliters. Id. at 7404.
Id. at 7403.
5, In the German Wine Act of July 14, 1971, [1971] BGB1. I 63, and the Sparkling Wine
and Brandy Regulations of July 15, 1971, [1971] BGB1. I 64, the term "Schaumwein" is to
be used to describe a sparkling wine which does not meet certain quality standards.
"Schaumwein" is also used to describe a sparkling wine in the German Text of Council
Regulation No. 816/70, Additional Provisions for the Common Market Organization for Wine,
[19701 E.E.C. J.O. No. L.99, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 614, at 677 (1973).
11 2 COMM. MKT. REP. 8293, at 7391.
56 See Court Rules Against German Wine Designations, Developments, 2 CCH COMM. MKT.
REP., Aug. 13, 1975, No. 272, at 6.
11 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8293, at 7385.
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that even if the legislation were contrary to the provisions of article 30 of
the Rome Treaty the restriction of appellations was permitted by article
36 5 if it could be justified on grounds of public policy (aimed at protecting
consumers) or on grounds of protection of industrial and commercial prop-
erty (aimed at protecting producers).5 9 The Court answered these argu-
ments by stating that the Rome Treaty does allow Member States to
legislate on indications of origin, but the Member States cannot do this
under the guise of article 36 when the effect is equivalent to a quantitative
restriction.'" Furthermore, derogations from article 30 are allowed under
article 36 only when necessary to protect the producer and the consumer
against fraudulent commercial practices,"1 and there was no possibility of
such fraud in this case. 2
However, this decision cannot be considered merely on the basis of anti-
consumer and anti-producer language, but must also be considered in light
of the economic and agricultural policies of the EEC as a whole. In order
to ensure observation of the Rome Treaty, the Court must consider not
only the literal meaning of the Rome Treaty's articles, regulations, and
directives, but also the policies underlying such provisions. ' In the
Sparkling Wines decision, the policy considerations were extensive and the
effects of the decision potentially far-reaching for several reasons.
First, the Member States have frequently introduced subtle restrictions
on imports and exports in order to benefit local companies and industries.,'
Therefore, the Court should not only pierce the subterfuges of the Member
States, but should also support the work of the Commission in exposing
them.
A second policy consideration is that mutual support among the EEC
institutions is imperative in order to achieve the goals of the EEC. The
Court has indicated support for the Commission and the Council in this
decision in several ways. It has supported the Commission in its enaction
of Directive 70/50. Various Member States have refused to acknowledge
Article 36 of the Rome Treaty, supra note 3, states:
The provisions of Articles 30 to 34 inclusive shall not be an obstacle to prohibitions
or restrictions in respect of importation, exportation or goods in transit which are
justified on grounds of public morality, public order, or public safety, the protection
of human or animal life or health, the preservation of plant life, the protection of
national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value, or the protection of
industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not,
however, constitute either a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised re-
striction on trade between Member States.
1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8293, at 7385, 7388, 7392.
'. Id. at 7392.
I d.
62 OECD, supra note 31.
Bentil, EEC Commercial Law and "Charges Having Equivalent Effect to Customs
Duties," 9 J. WORLD TRADE L. 458, 463 (1975).
" See, e.g., Public Prosecutor v. Benoit and Gustave Dassonville, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
8276 (1975).
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that certain measures mentioned in that directive could have an effect
equivalent to quantitative restrictions, and some Member States have
even disputed the Commission's authority to decide such matters through
the device of directives.15 The Court's reliance upon Directive 70/50 and its
interpretation of the Directive as extending to measures initiated after the
Rome Treaty entered into force have given credence to the Directive as an
EEC obligation."
Support of the Commission in the agricultural area is even more impor-
tant, since it is the prime formulator of agricultural policy in the EEC. 67
Before the Court rendered the Sparkling Wines judgment, another crisis
occurred in the wine market" which may have had a primary influence on
the Sparkling Wines decision. A wine surplus developed following record
harvests in 1973 and 1974 when production of wine increased without a
corresponding increase in consumption. 9 To cope with this crisis, the Com-
mission proposed that the wine regulations 7 be substantially amended. 71
The Sparkling Wines decision was rendered shortly thereafter. 72 It is possi-
ble that the Court foresaw great difficulties which could possibly cause
delay in reaching a compromise concerning any amendments to the wine
regulations. Possibly the Court feared that during such a delay, other
Member States might pass measures similar to Germany's self-protective
legislation. Thus, support of the actions of the Council and of the Commis-
sion in its resolve to prevent further upsets in the wine market became
crucial.
Unfortunately, the Court's prophecy concerning aggravation of the wine
crisis has been fulfilled. First, new amendments to the wine regulations
have not been enacted. 73 Secondly, in the summer of 1975, France proposed
a tax on wine imports from Italy.74 The Commission, possibly interpreting
the Sparkling Wines decision as a sign of support by the Court, threatened
to take France before the Court over the issue. 5 France, nevertheless,
65 Oebele, The Abolition of Measures Having an Equivalent Effect, 10 COMM. MKT. 55, 57
(1970).
:6 The Court of Justice is not required to follow directives. Id. at 55.
1 In theory the Council is the main decision-maker; however, "because of the complex
workings of the agricultural sector and because of the highly specialized expertise required,
in practice the true decision making role has been shifting more and more to the Commission
.... Norton, The Heart of the Matter: U.K. and the EEC, the Problem of Agriculture, 6
TEx. INT'L L.F. 221, 226 (1971).
Community Wine Market Due for Reorganization, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9756, at
9668 (1975) (Information Memo from the EEC Commission, No. P-30) [hereinafter cited as
Commission Memo].
69 Id.
70 Regulations cited note 30 supra.
Commission Memo, supra note 68, at 9668-69.
72 The Court's decision was rendered on February 20, 1975.
" EUROMARKET NEWS, CCH COMM. MKT. REP., Sept. 25, 1975, No. 349, at 1.
74 Id.
75 Id.
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implemented the tax, and the Commission has initiated formal proceed-
ings against France under article 169.6 In view of these developments, it
appears that the ultimate impact of the Sparkling Wines decision lies not
so much in its support of Commission Directive 70/50 as in its indication
that it will construe the prohibitions of the Rome Treaty strictly when
dealing with market areas immersed in crisis. The Sparkling Wines deci-
sion indicates that the Court will not tolerate even debatable violations of
the Rome Treaty when market areas immersed in crisis are involved.
Julie M. Clifford
" EUROMARKET NEWS, CCH COMM. MKT. REP., Oct. 28, 1975, No. 354, at 2.
